Abstract--Dynamic rent-seeking games with nonlinear cost functions are analyzed. The local asymptotic stability of the solution is first examined. We show that in the absence of a dominant agent, all eigenvalues of the Jacobian are real. Conditions are given for the local asymptotic stability as well as for the local instability of the equilibrium. In the presence of a dominant agent, complex eigenvalues are possible. Simple stability conditions ave presented for cases when all eigenvalues are real, and the possibility of limit cycles is analyzed in the case of complex eigenvalues. (~)
INTRODUCTION
Cournot oligopolies are one of the most frequently studied models in mathematical economics since the middle of the nineteenth century, when the classical work of Cournot [1] was published. The major research areas have included the existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium, the asymptotic properties of the equilibrium in dynamic oligopolies, as well as different variants and extensions of the classical model of Cournot. A comprehensive summary of the most important research findings on single-product models can be found in [2] , and the corresponding multiproduct models are discussed in [3[ . The extended research on oligopoly models has included group-equilibrium problems [4] , labor-managed oligopolies [5] , oligopsonies [6] , multistage [7] and hierarchical models [8] .
During the last two decades, increasing attention has been given to the analysis of rent-seeking games. The introductory paper of Tullock [9] has initiated a series of studies on the subject. A typical example of a rent-seeking game could be the process of applying for franchises, e.g., of well-known hamburger chains; these continually come up for renewal, and individuals wishing to bid for these typically would use professional bidding agents who could be viewed as the agents of our model. The basic model can be formulated in the following way.
0898-1221/01/$ -see front matter (~) 2001 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved. Typeset by A h/~S-TEX PII: S0898-1221 (01) Assume that n agents compete for a rent, which will earn a unit profit for the agent who actually wins the rent. Let xi denote the effort agent i spends in order to win the rent, and let X n ci(xi) be its cost. The probability of winning the rent for agent i is i/(:~-~j=l xj), and therefore, its expected profit is given as ci(xi).
n j=l Let Xi = ~+ be the set of feasible efforts of agent i; then an n-person noncooperative normal-form game F --{n, Xl,... , Xn, ~1,..., ~n} is formally defined, and is called a rent-seeking game in which the agents are the players, and Xi and ~i are the strategy set and payoff function of agent i (i = 1, 2,..., n). The existence of equilibrium of this game has been analyzed by several authors. Decreasing returns in rent-seeking technology as well as increasing returns were analyzed in [10] where the possibility of the agent's reaction function to be upward sloping was also examined. A systematic approach to establish the existence of an equilibrium has been also offered in this paper. Okuguchi [11] has pointed out that rent-seeking games are mathematically equivalent to profit maximizing Cournot oligopolies with hyperbolic price functions. He also proved the existence of a pure symmetric Nash equilibrium, when the agents have identical cost functions. These results have been extended to the nonsymmetric case in [12] , where the existence of a unique equilibrium is proved with convex cost functions. The existence and uniqueness of the equilibrium in rent-seeking games is not implied by the corresponding results on the classical Cournot model, since the strategy sets are not compact and hyperbolic price functions are not concave. Therefore, model-oriented special methods have had to be developed. The dynamic extension of rent-seeking games has been first examined in [13] and later in [14] , where the stability of the equilibrium was proved under certain convexity and monotonicity conditions. However, these conditions are not always satisfied for an important class of rentseeking games. Therefore, a more general, systematic approach is needed to describe stability conditions, and such is the aim of this paper.
There is no previous study investigating unstable equilibria and asymptotic behaviour that is more complex than asymptotical stability for rent-seeking games. Such study has been performed only for the classical Cournot model in [15] and [16] based on bifurcation theory. It is worth mentioning here that the types of dynamical systems we encounter below (as well as those in [15] and [16] ) are not unrelated to those encountered in population dynamics in mathematical biology. In this regard, the monograph [17] provides an excellent summary of the relevant mathematical results and techniques. This paper will provide a systematic stability analysis of rent-seeking games as well as consider the conditions under which the dynamics of such games can give rise to the birth of limit cycles.
THE DYNAMIC MODEL
The existence of equilibrium is usually examined by determining the best response functions of each player and investigating its analytic properties. For each agent i, denote Qi --~j#~ xj. For each Qi ~ 0, the best response of agent i can be obtained as
We assume that for each agent i, the cost function ci is twice continuously differentiable. If xi(Qi) > 0, then the first-and second-order conditions can be written as
Notice that relation (4) also guarantees that the left-hand side of equation (3) conditions (3) and (4). Thus, with the notation Q~ = Y~4~ ~z and ~ = y'~j=~ ~.j, the first-order condition (3) may be rewritten as
whilst the second-order condition (4) may be expressed as
We can easily show that the last two relations characterise the equilibrium efforts and cost derivatives• Select any arbitrary positive numbers Xl,.. , xn, and form the quantities g = Y~,=I i and (for all i), Qi = Y~4¢~xl • In addition, select any sequence ~{,... ,~ of real numbers that satisfy inequality (6)• Then, there is a rent-seeking game in which (Xl,-.., 2~) is an equilibrium and for all i, c~'(£i) --~', since for each i there is a strictly increasing cost function with given first and second derivatives at a single point. Assume next that the time scale is continuous, and at each time period t > 0, each agent adjusts its effort proportionally to its marginal profit• The resulting dynamic model has the form Q' -c~(zd) (7)
where ki > 0 is given for each i = 1, 2,..., n. The value of ki shows how fast agent i follows the profit changes. In the economic literature, ki is usually called the speed of adjustment. Notice that any positive equilibrium (el,... ,xn) is an equilibrium of this dynamic system as well as the consequence of the first-order conditions (5) . Assume that the initial vector x(0) is selected from a neighbourhood of this equilibrium. In the following sections, the local stability and the dynamic behaviour of the solution trajectory x_(t) will be investigated.
STABILITY ANALYSIS
In order to analyze the local asymptotic behavior of the solution of the dynamical system (7), its Jacobian at the equilibrium J has to be first determined. Simple differentiation shows that at the equilibrium 
Since the signs of the real parts of the eigenvalues determine the asymptotic behavior of the solution, we ignore the positive factor 1/~ 3. The characteristic polynomial of D + _al T can be written as
In order to simplify the notation, let di = ki(-~-$3c~'(2i)) and ei = ki(2i-Qi) for i = 1,2,..., n, and assume that the different di values are numbered so that dl < d2 < .-. < d~. Let It denote the set of agents with. the same dt value (1 = 1, 2,..., r), and let mt denote the number of agents in set Il. Then, the eigenvalues are the solutions of the equation
where "Yl = ~iez~ ei. The eigenvalues can be obtained in the following way. If ml > 1, then A = dl is an eigenvalue with multiplicity mt -1, and if mt= 1, then the corresponding factor cancels, so in this case A = dt is not an eigenvalue (l = 1, 2,... ,r). In this way, we have ml + ... + mr -r -n -r eigenvalues (included with multiplicities). The other eigenvalues are the solutions of the nonlinear equation
Since this is equivalent to a polynomial equation of degree r, it has r real (or complex) roots. The foregoing discussion may be summarized in the following theorem. (i) Assume that with some l, ml >_ 2 and dl > O. Then, the equilibrium is locally unstable. (ii) Suppose that for all l such that mz k 2, dl < 0. Let A1,...,A~ denote the roots of equation (12) .
If for at least one i,
Re Ai > 0, (13) then the equilibrium is locally unstable. If for all i, Re)h < 0, then the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable.
We note that in the second case of Theorem 1 when for all roots, Re fli _~ 0 and for at least one root Re Ai = 0, no conclusion can be given based only on analysis of the eigenvalues, since the system is nonlinear. In order to apply the above theorem, the locations of the roots of equation (12) should be determined. We will consider two major eases. CASE A. Assume that for all l, 7l -< 0.
Notice that if for some 1 the value of 71 is zero, then the corresponding term is missing from the left-hand side of equation (12) without changing its structure. Therefore, in the following discussion we may assume that inequality (14) is strict for all I. Introduce the function 7, 
. ,r-1). If g(O) < -1, then the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable, and if g(O) > -1, then the equilibrium is locally unstable. (iii) If dr > 0 and dr-1 >_ 0, then the equilibrium is locally unstable regardless of the signs of the other di values (i =-1, 2,..., r -2).
We note again that in the case when the largest root is zero, no conclusion can be given, since the system is nonlinear. CASE B. Suppose that for some l*, > 0.
We first show that this relation can hold for only one value of l*. Notice, first, that there is at most one dominant agent p such that ~p > Op. If set Ia does not contain this agent, then iEIa showing that agent p must belong to set Iz*. We show next that necessarily dr* < 0. The second-order conditions (6) imply that for the dominant agent p, 
iEI~.
For the sake of simplicity assume that l* = r. We still keep the assumption that dl < d2 < • .' < dr-l, and note that now dr is not necessarily the largest among the dL values. In this case, function g satisfies the following properties:
and lira g(A) = 0.
A-*q-co
Notice that no condition can be given on the sign of the derivative f(A) in this case. The shape of function g is illustrated in Figure 2 , where dr is either the largest, or the smallest among the dt values, or it is in the middle.
The above discussion allows us to state the following. 
., r -1). If dr >_ O, then the equilibrium is unstable. If dr < O, then in the case of g(O) > -1 the equilibrium is locally asymptotically stable, and if g(O) < -1, the equilibrium is locally unstable.
(ii) Assume now that dr < dz (1 = 1, 2 Notice that the theorem does not apply for cases when the largest real root is zero or there are no roots in the intervals indicated. In every case there are always (r -2) real roots, and therefore, either all roots are real, or there is exactly one complex conjugate pair of roots. next example shows that both possibilities might occur. EXAMPLE 1. Consider the special case when r = 2, kl = k2 --1, d2 ---1, dl = 0.
2£2 --$ = 3' > 0 be a parameter. From equation (18) we must have ~ < 1. Furthermore,
The Let By introducing the notation c~ ----(ml -1)$ we see that a can take on any nonnegative value. Then, equation (12) has the form which simplifies as
The discriminant is showing that the cases of both real and complex roots are possible. |
We have seen in the above discussion that Case B may occur only in the case of a dominant agent such that 2p > Qp. This inequality shows that at the equilibrium, agent p spends more effort than all other agents combined. In the case of an asymptotically stable equilibrium, this is the case for all t large enough. This assumption is therefore not very realistic, since antitrust constraints usually prohibit this kind of behaviour in the long run.
THE EMERGENCE OF LIMIT CYCLES
We have seen in the previous section that there are many plausible situations in which the equilibrium of the rent-seeking game may be locally unstable. The question arises as to what is the fate of the dynamic rent-seeking game in such situations. One possibility is that the outcome of the game cycles around the equilibrium. This could, for instance, be the case if the speeds of reaction, ki, are relatively large so that there is continual overshooting of the equilibrium. Such could be the situation in the case of a locally unstable equilibrium if we could demonstrate the existence of limit cycle motion by applying the Hopf bifurcation theorem (see, for example, [18] ). To this end we need to determine the regions in the parameter space where pure complex eigenvalues exist. Letting A = is, then equation (12) Notice that this is a polynomial equation of degree r -1 for (~2, which can be solved by routine methods (see, for example, [19] ). Notice that in case (i) of Theorem 3, the left-hand side is always positive, so no real root exists. This observation coincides with the corresponding results when we saw that all roots of equation (12) 
Equating the real and imaginary parts,
and
4A-(~ 2 l+gr 2 1+a 2
Notice that we are interested in the case of a ~ 0. So, solving both equations for 7/(1 + a2), we ger~
A fourth-order equation is therefore obtained for a a 4 + a2(5 + a --2b) + (4 + a -8b) = 0.
Notice that this equation will have positive roots if 4 + a-8b < 0. In order to satisfy relation (18), we have to guarantee that 7 < 1, that is, Substituting these values into equation (25), we see that 7 ~ 0.799. By differentiating equation (24) with respect to 7, we have the derivative value
which has the approximating value (0.468 + 0.719i) at A = ia with the above values of a and 7. Hence, the real part is nonzero showing the existence of a limit cycle. |
We have established the possibility of limit cycle motion in the case of local instability. Our analysis does not enable us to say anything about the stability of such limit cycles. In order to do so, we would need to specify in some detail the nonlinear structure of the dynamic rentseeking game and apply normal form theory (see [18] ). However, very often these calculations are intractable and it becomes necessary to resort to numerical methods as in [15] . Such analysis warrants a paper in its own right, and we leave this task for future research.
CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, nonlinear rent-seeking games were analyzed where the cost functions were assumed to be nonlinear. A dynamic adjustment process in which each agent adjusts its output proportionally to its marginal profit was examined. The local asymptotic stability of the equilibrium was first examined. In the absence of a dominant agent, it turns out that all eigenvalues are real. Conditions for the local asymptotic stability and also for the local instability of the equilibrium were then derived. In the presence of a dominant agent, complex eigenvalues are also possible. Simple conditions were presented for the stability and also for the instability of the equilibrium in the case of real eigenvalues. If complex eigenvalues are possible, then we have shown the possibility of limit cycles via the use of the Hopf bifurcation theorem.
Future research could focus on the specific nature of nonlinearities and analyse the stability of the limit cycle motion that emerges when the equilibrium becomes locally unstable. A further avenue of research would be how agents come to learn the optimal effort of all other agents. Here, we have assumed that each agent knows instantaneously the optimal effort of all other agents. However, it would be more realistic to assume that this is learnt with some time delay. Such learning could, for example, be modelled using the continuously distributed lags employed in [15] and [16] to analyse such learning in oligopoly models.
